India - China cold war

Friday, July 27, 2007

...thoughts of a System Integrator

"Jacks of all trades,” and preferably master of some (though often better than master of one). SI is the road i choose to walk on... its sure is a line that gives me a kick :)
Here is my take on it... I think the biggest challenge in today’s service economy is how best to bridge the gap between business and technology. Within an Open Source environment (some experience swimming this ocean), the gap is the empty space between the business vision, strategy and the technology required to realize that strategy on an ongoing basis.

Consider...legacy systems, multiple databases, each serving different types of accounts with little to no automated data sharing. How does a major business process map through all the hardware and software elements of the datacenter? How does it all tie together, how easy is it to make a change or even understand the implications of a potential change? These i believe are major hindrances toward a more seamless, flexible environment in which the vision, strategy, and technology are all coordinated.

In order for an SI to move beyond being one person or company that integrates disparate systems into a datacenter environment, they need to be able to bridge the connections between the systems and business. And the only way to successfully do this is to understand the business. Good SI’s hold the advantage in this approach as they understand business top to bottom, comprising skills of part business executive, part industry consultant, part technologist, and part innovator.

Why?
-Well
SIs also have the role of driving the best technologies into business...Many of the best technologies are built from startups, particularly in the open source space. And these startups, with their great technological innovations, don’t have an easy entry into the mass corporations. The SIs have this penetration capability with their skills, proven solutions, and their relationships.
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The priority, of course, for an SI is to ensure our customers have the best offerings for their mission critical environments. As an SI, you simply will not succeed unless your customers do. I think SI's due to their inherent role in their respective corporates have a genuine focus in making their clients succeed and form strategic relationships that go a long way into making corporates successful. I firmly believe that no matter the USP offered, the name you carry, the promises you make to deliver on commitments, you got nothing until you have a chemistry with your customer - that my friend is what SI's ultimately do for you...

Monday, March 06, 2006

India successfully using "remote viewing" & satellite technologies for counter & strategic intelligence

RAW is using advanced satellite technologies and remote viewing techniques to look into foreign intelligence activities within India. Remote viewing is the paranormal activities with psychics that can sense into the future and unknown. CIA in America has used remote viewing for many years. Many times remote viewing has worked very well for the CIA and the Russian intelligence.

Recent days India has seen a massive amount Pakistan's ISI agents arrested all over the country. The situation has gone so bad for Pakistan and Al-Queda that they are looking for reasons what is really happening. Taking clue from CIA, RAW Indian counterpart started remote viewing techniques many years back. They also tried to correlate the remote viewing readings with high tech feedbacks like satellite sensing and imaging. This is being further validated with the agents' report in the field. The net results for RAW and CBI (Central Bureau of Intelligence - equivalent of FBI) are astounding.

Sources say India has locked in close surveillance over most of foreign agencies within the country. RAW has recently expanded the efforts for strategic intelligence. This include spying over Pakistan, China and the Western nations.

The reason for the success is attributable to traditional Indian cultural richness in spirituality and paranormal activities.

The remote viewing activities are nothing new for India. Indians traditionally have been doing it for thousands of years. But now India is doing it for a reason.

Satellite technologies are also helping understand movement of Pakistan's ISI supported militants in South Asia. Sources close to RAW say Pakistan's ISI is more active in Bangladesh and North East India than Kashmir these days. In the field, the agents are confirming these information.

According to some remote viewers, Bangladesh has recently seen enormous amount of violence related to election. Pakistan's main goal is not Kashmir at this time. It is to hijack Bangladesh again and start a covert front on the east of India.

Remote viewing if applied in a wrong way can cause catastrophe and total embarrassment. An ideal example would be the WMD information in Iraq. Seventy-three thousand pages of secret documents have recently been declassified in the United States. The information unveiled the activity of two special groups that worked with extrasensory individuals. The CIA had to acknowledge that it used remote viewers and other individuals possessing paranormal abilities for intelligence purposes.

According to Pravda.Ru CIA's remote viewers initiated quest for WMD in Iraq. Obviously they were wrong at least based on what we know today.

CIA's remote viewing activities has been not all that failure.

"Psychic spy" Joseph McMoneagle also known as "remote viewing agent #001" was shown a spot on the map of the USSR, where the mysterious secret object was supposedly located, as CIA agents thought. McMoneagle put his finger on the map and described the image that he saw in his mind:

"It is a congregation of low stone and concrete buildings. A huge underground warehouse filled with lethal weapons, not only missiles. There are other square and round items there. I see a very high column of smoke, bearing some semblance to a huge lifting crane, rising above the area (it was most likely the smoke of a nuclear blast). The people inhabiting that place are sick. Their hair is receding, their bones are putrefying. They deliver sick children, and they are still obsessed with some idea."

It was quite an eloquent description for secret agents to understand, what kind of an object was located in Semipalatinsk (which is now a town in the republic of Kazakhstan). Then CIA Director Richard Helms moved the paranormal espionage from the category "Research" to the category "Practice." Joseph McMoneagle's success as a remote viewer increased the funding of such unusual activities, not to mention the improved moral aspect. The US authorities spent about $2 million a year on a rather small group of 20 extrasensory individuals in the 1990s.
Other achievements of American psychic agents include: factories making weapons of mass destruction in third world countries, including Iraq (it is not ruled out that the information about WMD in Iraq sprang from remote viewers.) Extrasensory intelligence officers also developed certain recommendations to recruit CIA agents and rendered some other services too.

India's achievement in remote viewing and use of advanced technologies is remarkable in recent days. According to some international experts what really worked for India is not just remote viewing but the availability of the field agents who could confirm the clues from the remote viewers.

INTELLIGENCE DECLASSIFIED [MORAM]

MOSSAD / RAW / Mi-4 (MORAM)
Foreign Intelligence Unit (13)
Operations Desk
Summer offensive report: Part 1 of many to follow [ if i live after this... :) ].

CIT – “X” Operations

Though the peace offensive (confidence building measures) through the Composite Dialogue process continues, RAW continues to actively engage in its power play to rock the boat and encircle the enemy. Method of two-prong attack—“Peace through dialogue and war through RAW”— is running superbly.

Tactics of the dragon policy.

Pakistani Intelligence agencies are employing Hindus and even Muslims as militants who cross into India.

In retaliation to the unending terrorist pursuits of Pakistan; RAW and MOSSAD had conceived the summer offensive a year ago. Modus operandi has been successful – brief on operational tactics follows:

Intelligence has successfully taped known international drug and mafia dons against Pakistan. CIT ‘X’ and some international crooks with people of Indian origin pay Pakistan in the same coin. CIT ‘X’ is effectively training agents for covert operations in Pakistan. Under the Vajpayee government, the CIT ‘X’ and other sensitive organizations were authorized to strengthen contacts with ‘sleeping agents’, and recruit new front men to carry out covert operations in Pakistan.

We have also engaged all possible international criminals and mercenaries, including Afgans for covert purposes during LK Advani’s tenure in the Home Ministry. Just before the Indian parliamentary elections, officials have met the international criminal council “somewhere” in South East Asia and assured Indian Government’s continued support. CIT ‘X’ is actively involved in drug trafficking to finance its covert operations.

Illegal poppy is being cultivated in bulk in Himachal Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram and Uttar Pradesh. Dharamshala as a result has become one of the most infamous centers of drugs in Himachal Pradesh. Drug barons have close links with their Afghan counterparts and completely controlled and continuously monitored by various intelligence agencies. According to current statistics, 25 per cent of Indian poppy is being diverted into illegal markets worldwide. The booming poppy crop in Himachal Pradesh and Northeast region has led to deployment of local refining laboratories to make heroin. India today stands as the fifth largest country in the world in the production of illicit opium. Laos is 4th with 20 metric tons and has direct tie up with RAW and internal drug barons. Some people of Indian origin living in Surinam and Holland have been engaged to facilitate Indian agencies in drug trafficking. Under the benign patronage of CIT ‘X’, the ‘business’ of drug trafficking is flourishing, and the money earned is accounted for and is being directed towards covert activities in Pakistan.

The summer offensive includes establishment of 57 training camps in Occupied Kashmir, East Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Assam to train and launch terrorists inside Pakistan. Trainees are generally drawn from the Indian hatched dissident groups of Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), Jiye Sindh Mohaz (JSM), Jiye Sindh Students Federation (JSF) and Balochi nationalists and other nationalist groups from various parts of Sindh, Balochistan and Tribal Areas.

Offensive under Diplomatic Cover.The MOSSAD hand

Most of the Indian Embassies/Consulates around the world are being used as dens for hatching RAW plots. The set-ups are grouped together on regional basis under one head, known as the RAW center. This includes the espionage efforts as well as the subversion, sabotage and terrorism oriented operations. For Pakistan RAW centers at London, Dubai, Iran, and South Africa operate against Pakistan jointly with Israeli MOSSAD. However, for its summer offensive, RAW, in a joint effort with MOSSAD has laid out a whole network around Pakistan, to ensnare it in a trap and tighten the noose around it through destabilization.

India has opened Consulates (IOC’s) in Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, besides having an oversized diplomatic mission in Kabul.

Kandahar and Jalalabad are near the borders of Pakistan, which insinuates many things. The ongoing Wana operation is being fed cash, weapons and ammunition indirectly by RAW operatives under cover of Al-Qaeda. MOSSAD and AMMAN have also contributed heavily towards the funding and material requirements for these operations. The direct result of this was the effective slaying of 121 Pakistani regular infantry soldiers on Nov 8th’2004, just 3 days after the infusion of war material and assistance in logistics and planning operations of the tribals by operatives of RAW.

Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS). The IRANI involvement:

Iran, having contiguous borders with Pakistan, is a hotbed of intrigues and constant source of support and inspiration to RAW functionaries. The Indian Embassy at Tehran and Consulates in Zahidan, Mashhad and Bandar Abbas are actively engaged in establishing links with disgruntled elements of Balochistan and Sindh for destabilizing these provinces. Iran also serves as a base for fomenting sectarian trouble in Pakistan. Irani intelligence has been providing reliable information and support to RAW operations by using disgruntled Shia elements in Pakistan.

This intelligence model is a improvement on the practices of MOSSAD, which has infiltrated several Jewish agents into the occupied territory of Palestine as Muslims. These agents practice Islam like any ordinary Muslim. They say prayers in mosques, observe fast during Ramadan, and mingle into local Muslim population just to wait for the appropriate time to strike. During the armed struggle in former East Pakistan, Indian army regulars, after they were physically made to look like Muslims and taught Bangla, were pushed into East Pakistan to fight as Mukti Bahini against the Pakistan Army.”

The summer offensive of RAW includes working on ethnic, regional, parochial and secular themes, which include Sindhu Desh Movement in Sindh, Saraiki Movement in Punjab, Tribal Balochis in the name of Greater Balochistan and taking advantage of Northern Alliance Government in Afghanistan and using its tentacles at Kabul, Jalalabad, Khost, Kandahar and Spin Boldak, the tribals in Waziristan and Balochistan are continuously being kept activated for fomenting trouble - while Taliban and Al-Qaeda are getting the blame and Pakistan gets the rap for “not doing enough” by US and “FRIENDLY” Afghan authorities.

After the Indian consulate in Karachi was wound up. RAW started maintaining contacts in their sources/links in Pakistan through their consulates at Zahidan and Dubai. Most of the staff at Indian Consulate in Zahidan is from intelligence/security organisations including RAW, Intelligence Bureau and Military Intelligence. The sizeable cover staff in their Embassy at Dubai under the pretence of tourist traffic. The set-ups are dedicated units mainly responsible for promoting ethnic unrest in Pakistan. They continue to provide financial and material support to various regionalist/sectarian parties in Sindh and Balochistan

UAE Angle:

UAE is being used as a launching pad for terrorist activities in Pakistan. Agents are getting hold of young, disgruntled elements and after carrying out their proper brainwashing, they are dispatched to Dubai. Indian Consulate in Dubai is issuing temporary passport to these activists for getting training/briefing. After completion of their formal training, they are launched into Pakistan to carry out their terrorist/sabotage activities.

To cripple the economy of Pakistan, RAW has taken it upon itself the responsibility of pumping fake currency into Pakistan through various illegal means. RAW and various Indian and Foreign Intelligence Agencies have also been patronizing various local dissident groups in Pakistan. As mentioned, the prominent ones are - Sindhi Desh Movement in Sindh, Saraiki Movement in Punjab and tribal Balochis in the name of Greater Balochistan.

To fan flames of Sindhi Desh Movement, subversive literature, published from Bombay and Jammu eg, Sindh Sujag, Sindh Rises; Sindh Parcham, Sangat and lot of other subversive material is being pumped into Sindh clandestinely. With regard to support for the Saraiki Movement, it is worth mentioning that we are morally and materially supporting the Saraiki Movement in southern Punjab. Regional Political Parties like Saraiki Suba Mahaz, Pakistan Saraiki Party and Saraiki Sahilya Sangam are being effectively sponsored. Their operators in southern Punjab are being supported by accepting Saraiki as the second state language in Indian-held Punjab. All India Radio/TV are regularly broadcasting various Saraiki programmes. Subversive literature in huge quantity is being published on the subject.

The success of RAW/MOSSAD/MOIS activities is reflected in the fact that a section of respected and influential intellectuals have started voicing for the cause of Punjab/Punjabis from the platform of World Punjabi Congress. This has effectively started the trend of widening the gulf of misunderstanding among various provinces of Pakistan.

RAW is also involved in sponsoring Balwaristan Movement. It is being organised under Abdul Hamid, self-styled chairman of his own faction of Balwaristan National Front (BNF) based in Delhi. The Front is working for the independence of Northern Areas. It has been inculcating into Pakistan and highly subversive material from abroad.

Conclusion

Pakistan has been effectively engaged in for a long hot summer as the summer offensive continues. Despite fencing the LoC with a highly sophisticated system of monitors and sensors, and reducing infiltration to 92%, India on the diplomatic front must continue to persist in blaming Pakistan for “cross-border terrorism” and “infiltrating militants” while it foments trouble deep inside Pakistani economic and military centers. It should be noted that the problems created by Pakistan in the state of Jammu and Kashmir tend to hurt Pakistan more on the economic, military and diplomatic front.

The key to lasting peace is not merely on the diplomatic approach but by making genuine efforts to encircle and balkanize the Pakistani economic and military establishment, thereby giving India the command and control of influencing Pakistani and as an extension Chinese foreign policy.

Burning Balochistan

Balochistan Intelligence Review (as per "South Asia Intelligence Review")

The stage for escalated, and possibly extraordinary, violence has been set in Balochistan. Addressing the media at Turbat in the province on December 16, 2004, President Pervez Musharraf declared that his Government would crush all anti-Pakistan movements: "We are gathering information through intelligence and other sources that who is doing what in the area and I warn them because when the Government starts action against them, they will be crushed."

This declaration of intent only completes what has been on the cards, at least since 31st March 2004, when the General had declared on the Pakistan Television (PTV) "Newsnight" program, that the problem with Balochistan was that only 5 per cent of the area was 'A area', while 95 per cent was 'B', where the police did not operate. Soon, he had stated, the entire 95 per cent 'B area' would be made into 'A area'. Already, he disclosed further, five districts in the 'B area' had been declared 'A area'.

[The British colonial administration divided Balochistan into A and B Areas: the former were under direct British control and administration; in the latter, the British exercised proxy control through the Sardars or tribal chiefs. The system was continued after Independence by the Pakistan Establishment.]

With its vast potential for a wide range of natural resources, including oil, uranium, copper and other minerals, its critical strategic location - it commands over 900 miles of the Arabian Sea coastline, and the development, particularly, of the Gwadar Port with massive Chinese financial and technical assistance, 'stabilizing' Balochistan and consolidating Islamabad's administrative hold over the province is emerging as an overarching objective of the present regime.

These objectives militate directly both against the long-standing system of near autonomy most of the province has enjoyed since and even before the creation of Pakistan, and against a number of critical demands consistently held by the Baloch people and leadership. Specifically, the Baloch Ittehad (Baloch Unity) movement seeks, among a range of other objectives, to bring an end to the exploitation of Baloch resources by Islamabad, particularly by North Punjab; to secure fair royalties for Baloch gas; to secure employment for locals in projects being executed in Baloch areas; and to ensure that revenues from various projects in Balochistan are invested in the province itself.

More significantly, the Baloch have long and bitter memories of Islamabad's repression and betrayal over the past, and there is great venom against the 'Punjabis' in the Baloch discourse. In the 1950s, after an unsuccessful insurrection, Pakistan offered a General Amnesty to the rebels, but when their leaders came out they were hanged. This betrayal weighs heavily in the consciousness of the Baloch, as does the brutality with which the rebellion of the 1970s was suppressed, with indiscriminate use of superior firepower - including air power - against Baloch camps and villages in which thousands were killed.

But the current sentiment goes well beyond the bitterness of historical memories to a fear of an existential threat, as Islamabad unfolds its plans to transform the very character of all of Balochistan. The military regime has reportedly decided to replace the Levies (the local enforcement apparatus) and to provide full powers to the police to control law and order. This would bring 25 districts of Balochistan into province-wide policing, and do away with the traditional institution of Levies, which are manned substantially by the locals. The Federal Interior Ministry is reported to have finalized a Rupees 9.6 billion security plan under which the 'B areas' would be converted into 'A areas' under this scheme, and for which 9,866 personnel would be recruited.

Changing the structure of policing in Balochistan is central to a deeper re-engineering of the entire power structure in Balochistan. Many of the tribes have already been bought over or neutralized and it is only among a few dominant tribes such as the Bugtis and the Maris that an independent power base survives.

The Pakistan Establishment has systematically diluted the traditional system of working through the Sardars, because the local leadership is no longer trusted. The Sardars, in turn, jealously guard their socio-political and financial control in the regions, and seek to 'keep the destiny of Balochistan in their own hands'. Each of Islamabad's new experiments at social engineering is, consequently, deeply resented, as is the increasing dominance of the 'Punjabis' in Islamabad.

Clearly, the Sardars now realize that Musharraf has confronted them with a 'do-or-die' choice. If the General succeeds in transforming all of Balochistan into 'A areas', the power of the Sardars will have ended. The current struggle is, consequently, quite different from the insurrections of the 1950s and the 1970s. The Sardars, in the present instance, are completely united. Earlier movements had individual tribes rebelling, and these were individually targeted in concentrated areas in the mountains into which they escaped.

The current and mounting insurgency is radically different. Presently, a majority of Balochistan is covered, and almost all tribes have been united in their opposition to Islamabad in the enveloping Baloch Ittehad The political leadership of the Ittehad comprises Khair Buksh Marri, Akbar Bugti, Attaullah Mengal, Abdul Hayee Baloch and Hasil Bizenjo. Marri rejects the Parliamentary system, and is more prone to 'direct action'. Bugti leads a political party - the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), but also retains armed cadres. Mengal has adopted the path of political protest and mobilization, and is the Chairman of the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONAM). Hayee Baloch and Bizenjo are leaders of the National Party (NP).

While Marri, Bugti and Mengal are Sardars, Baloch and Bizenjo come from ordinary middle class backgrounds. All have come together in a loosely cooperative structure under the banner of the Ittehad This present movement, consequently, is an inclusive movement representing wide Balochi interests, not just the Sardars and there has been increasing popular consciousness of exploitation among the common Baloch, which now transcends elite interest groups.

This has translated into a calibrated and widely dispersed campaign of attacks virtually across the length and breadth of Balochistan. Total casualties have, however, remained relatively small - given the South Asia context - with some 94 dead and 303 wounded in the current year (till December 14). However, vital installations and state actors have been repeatedly targeted and the strife in Balochistan is emerging as a critical internal security problem for Islamabad.

The most alarming aspect of this crisis, from Islamabad's perspective, is the sheer spatial and temporal distribution of attacks on the Army and security forces, vital installations and sporadic skirmishes. These have been reported throughout the year from north-central Balochistan (Kohlu and Dera Bugti), the capital Quetta (also the hub of sectarian terrorism) in the west, and Gwadar, Kech, and Khuzdar in the south. Encounters between the troops and 'Baloch nationalists' have been on the upswing since the middle of 2004 and furthermore, increased army presence ('protective deployment' according to military regime spokesperson Major General Shaukat Sultan) has led to high-profile targets like Chief Minister Jam Muhammad Yousaf falling under the compass of violence.

Nevertheless, the pattern of insurgent violence thus far suggests that the Balochis are essentially demonstrating their capabilities, rather than using them to the fullest. Hence, the low fatality levels, uncommon for violence-wrecked South Asia. Actions are being calibrated to a threshold that keeps the movement alive, while a fuller commitment is kept at abeyance till clearer assurance of support is secured from one or another external power. It is significant, in this context, to note that, though fatalities have been kept low, rocket attacks and improvised explosive device explosions have been an almost daily affair throughout 2004. In May 2004 alone, for instance, approximately 140 rocket attacks were recorded, targeting the gas pipelines in Sui, while some 120 rocket attacks were reported in June.

The insurgency has gradually spread across the whole of Balochistan, and is not concentrated in any one sector. Strikingly, there is no locus of command either, and the Balochis, wiser for their experience in the 1970s, appear to have ensured that their movement will not easily be 'decapitated'. A deeper scrutiny of the insurgency also reveals that no single leader is central to its survival, and there are indications derived from operational patterns that suggest that the movement has, in fact, been dispersed down to the level of cells comprising 2 to 10 persons.

Widening the strategic depth of the insurgency, the Baloch have sought to exploit the situation prevailing in Waziristan as well. Insurgents from the tribal belt have reportedly begun crossing into the mountain ranges of Balochistan. Tarique Niazi notes that, "they seamlessly melt into the latter's capital city, Quetta, which houses predominantly Pakhtun population, alongside the burgeoning demographic growth of Baluchs on its skirts."

However, the current insurgent activities are like warning shots fired over the bow, not an open insurgency as yet. While it is true that grievances which form necessary conditions for an insurgency are a reality in Balochistan, they have not been adequate enough, thus far, to trigger a major conflagration. Most violence is 'nationalist' and there is no co-operation between Islamists in the North and the Balochs, and there is little love lost between the Mullahs and the Sardars. Fortunately for Islamabad, though the Balochis are devout, they are not fundamentalist. Indeed, efforts by the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) to consolidate the influence of the Mullahs in Balochistan is seen as a direct threat to the power and influence of the Sardars.

The crisis has acquired additional urgency as a result of a multiplicity of 'externalities' linked to the strategic location and natural resources of the province. Chinese involvement is clearly growing in Balochistan, and as the region becomes increasingly important, its security dimensions cannot be neglected. Gwadar is, in fact, being projected as a major economic hub in the region, facilitating imports and exports between Pakistan and China. While negotiations are currently underway for investment and collaboration in coal-fired power generation, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz during his visit to China from December 14 to 18, 2004, signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the expansion of Gwadar seaport channel capacity for facilitating large vessels.

Further, China is to continue work on the Rupees 16 billion Saindak Project as Pakistan has reportedly expressed its willingness to extend the lease of Saindak copper-gold mines in Balochistan for another 20 years. Crucially, the Gwadar Port is part of China's long-term strategy to consolidate its strategic presence in the region, and its maritime dominance in the Persian Gulf. The security of these and a widening spectrum of projects for 'economic cooperation' in the province is, consequently, pivotal, and it is believed that China has made it amply clear to Islamabad that a repeat of the incident of May 3, 2004, at Gwadar Port, in which three Chinese engineers lost their lives, would be 'unacceptable'.

US interests in the province are also increasing. While the Government has sought to dispel notions that the US may be permitted to locate military bases in Balochistan, analysts point out that the US military has, for long, targeted the development of a base near Dalbandin and Pasni, 180 miles west of Karachi, close to the Gwadar Port. A further deepening of Pakistan's relations with the United States, including plausible base access, are to a certain extent co-terminus with the plans underway to consolidate the Army's control over Balochistan, which could project 'strategic depth' into Central Asia and the Gulf region.

Another, albeit ambivalent, externality relates to Iran's interest in Balochistan. Iran's population includes about two per cent of Baloch, who nevertheless dominate or have very significant presence in the Zahedan , Khorasan, Seistan and Balochistan (Iran). The Baloch are Sunnis, and Baloch separatism - and the unity of the Baloch across the Iran-Pakistan border - is seen as a threat by Teheran as well.

Indeed, at the height of the suppression of the Baloch movement in Pakistan in the 1970s, US-supplied Iranian combat helicopters, at least some of them manned by Iranian pilots, had joined the Pakistan Air Force in its strafing and bombing of Baloch camps and villages. At other times, Iran's general hostility to predominantly Sunni Pakistan, and its involvement in the sectarian conflict within Pakistan, has tempted it to support the Balochis. Currently, however, there is no evidence of such support.

Other complexities also color the situation in Balochistan. At least one of these involves an internal clash of interests in US policy. While the US is broadly committed to the general 'stabilization' of Pakistan, it does have a vested interest in delaying projects that would establish a dominant Chinese strategic presence in the region, particularly the Port of Gwadar. There would, consequently, be some US interest in persistent, though low grade, violence in the province.

The cumulative force of these considerations, however, is that the Islamabad now places the highest priority on the 'pacification' of Balochistan. Given his temperament, Musharraf's first inclination is to crack down. By nature an impatient man, he would seek to cement Islamabad's dominion in the province during his own tenure, and his decisions would be based more on his assessment of how necessary tranquility in the region is for Pakistan's economic and strategic interests, and not on objective assessments of the Baloch insurgency.

The primary response, consequently, has been military. In October this year, Lieutenant General Hamid Rab Nawaz was handpicked to head the 12 Corps based at Quetta, which is in charge of the Baloch Operations. Nawaz, a Punjabi from Chakwal and, like Musharraf, a Commando, shares Musharraf's belief structures and orientation, and is believed to have been sent specifically to Quetta to 'take care' of the situation. The 12 Corps comprises two divisions, the 33rd and the 41st, both headquartered at Quetta, but currently projected in 'protective deployments' across the province. In addition, the Frontier Corps (FC) - a paramilitary force - has its units present all over Balochistan.

The FC is officered and overwhelming manned by non-Balochis, and is deeply resented, with most recent rebel rocket attacks targeting its personnel. There has, till now, been no additional allocation of Forces to Balochistan, though available evidence suggests that counter-insurgency operations are being carried out in wide areas of the province, including in Kohlu, Dera Bugti, Gwadar, Turbat and Makran.

There is, however, a danger here that Islamabad may well be biting off more than it can chew. In November 2003, in what was possibly a moment of braggadocio, Musharraf had declared that only five per cent of Balochistan was a 'trouble spot' and that he would 'straighten out' the trouble-making Baloch leaders. This is clearly a misreading of the situation on the ground, and while the present Force deployment may be sufficient to 'contain' the violence at existing levels, particularly given the present proclivities of the rebels themselves, it is far from adequate to secure the radical structural transformations that Musharraf appears to be committed to, and to suppress the natural local responses these can be expected to provoke in an entrenched, deeply traditional and historically hostile society.

The troubles in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) have already stretched Islamabad's Forces, with over 70,000 troops stationed in South Waziristan alone. Additional commitments in Balochistan would demand a dramatic redrafting of national strategies, and it appears that the military regime has not, in fact, visualized the deployments that would be required in a rapidly worsening internal security scenario in Balochistan.

Crucially, Balochistan's unforgiving terrain would not yield to marginal increments in deployment. Topography provides undetectable gateways to the Baloch on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Some areas of Afghanistan (Nemroz, Helmand and Farah) also have significant Baloch population, and historically these have constituted safe areas for rebels during earlier uprisings.

More significantly, harshness of the terrain and the sheer expanses of the province - 347,641 square kilometers, nearly 43 per cent of Pakistan's total area - are such that, in conventional counter-insurgency operations, virtually the whole of the Pakistan Army could sink into the province without being able to establish full control. Sir Charles Napier once remarked that Balochistan was "the place where God threw the rubbish when He made the world."

Selig Harrison in his authoritative work, In Afghanistan's Shadow, notes that "getting from one of these valleys to the next on foot can be a precarious business: there are few passes, and many of them are not negotiable even by local donkeys accustomed to the jagged terrain." But for the Baloch, according to a 16th century war ballad, he adds, "the lofty heights are our comrades... the pathless gorges our friends." With an insurgency dispersed across the whole geographical area of Balochistan, it will be impossible to repeat the successes of the 1970s, when small locations in the mountains where particular rebellious tribes had fled were targeted with overwhelming force.

Further, vast areas of Balochistan can easily be cut off from the rest of Pakistan and there are just two routes from provincial capital Quetta to Karachi, both of which can be disrupted or interdicted. The evidence of earlier Baloch rebellions indicates that the Baloch knows and can live off the terrain, is a hardy fighter, virtually 'born with weapons', and makes a formidable adversary. There is, moreover, no shortage of weapons among the rebels. These can easily be purchased from the Afghan surplus, both within Pakistan and in Afghanistan. Wide and relatively indiscriminate state violence will be necessary if the Baloch are to be 'crushed' once again.

Such violence is, of course, not beyond Islamabad's capacities. The insurrections of the 1950s and 1960s were, in fact, suppressed through unrestrained violence, with air power widely used to strafe and destroy civilian concentrations. Musharraf himself may, also, not be particularly averse to such extreme measures - he had, after all, earned himself the sobriquet of the 'Butcher of Baltistan' during his campaigns as a Brigadier in the Northern Areas.

It is questionable, however, whether such state repression would be sustainable within the current international context - despite the extraordinary indulgences the 'international community', and particularly the US, has inclined to extend to this persistent offender against international standards. Pakistan appears, currently, to be preparing grounds to justify extreme use of force in the province, planting reports that Osama bin Laden may be in Balochistan and that some Al Qaeda leaders, who were discovered in Iran, had escaped to that country through Balochistan. The presence of Taliban and Al Qaeda elements (essentially supported by the Pashtuns in the North Balochistan areas) is being projected in order to justify action against wider Baloch targets further South.

Some diversionary 'political initiatives' have, however, also been announced to manage the dissent in Balochistan. The most significant of these was the appointment during Shujaat Hussain's brief tenure as Prime Minister, of a Parliamentary Committee comprising two sub-committees, one to look into the problems in Balochistan, and the other to examine the question of 'Provincial Autonomy'. The former was headed by Mushahid Hussain, who has since made more than one visit to Balochistan and has met all the chieftains.

The Balochistan Sub-Committee's report is to be submitted on January 7, 2005. The Provincial Autonomy sub-committee, which has only met a couple of times, has seen little movement. These committees essentially constitute a classical South Asian tactic that relies on delay to diffuse political crises. Given the circumstances in Balochistan, it is improbable that such stratagem will significantly influence the larger course of events.

The military crackdown in Balochistan is clearly slated for intensification. The operations against the jirgas in Waziristan have already demonstrated that no one can be exempt from punitive action if Islamabad's authority is challenged, and that Musharraf believes that there are certain areas of Pakistan that have to be 'quietened' in the immediate future. With the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) relatively secured, it is now Balochistan's turn.

Other events that may propel such action beyond a 'turning point' would include an act of major sabotage at Gwadar; a major disruption of the gas pipeline; or the linking up of Baloch forces across international borders. Even absent such extreme provocation, the province appears to be headed for an extended period of bloody violence that may well have defining consequences for the future of Pakistan itself.

Israel – Its dealings with India and its nuclear armoury

Eliyahu Leviteh, deputy director of Israel's nuclear energy agency, paid a visit to India in early December 2004 for meetings with his Indian counterparts. Seemingly India and Israel are building up an alliance against Pakistan, a Muslim nuclear power, and, just possibly, Iran, which the Israelis believe has nuclear ambitions. Fairly accurate disclosure of the latest information about the size of the Israeli nuclear forces follows:

The visit of Leviteh, a veteran Israeli expert on nuclear non-proliferation, signals the highest level of secret co-operation with another country. How big are the nuclear arsenals of the two countries? Our informant believes that Israel has some 200 warheads capable of being launched from land, sea and air. The Indian arsenal is thought to be smaller.

Information about Israeli-Indian co-operation is top secret. As informed , Leviteh was authorised by the government to give India an idea of the effectiveness of the Israeli nuclear armoury.

It appears that the Israelis have improved their platforms for carrying nuclear warheads. Foreign Report’s can reveal that Indian pilots visited Israel recently and were guests of the new strategic long-haul F-16I / Sufa squadron. It is believed that the Indian pilots received a thorough briefing about this strategic squadron, which the Israelis are preparing, along with their F-151 squadron, for an attack on a foreign target, possibly Iran.

US pilots outwitted :

Foreign report has obtained some intriguing information about a related development that could affect Israel's relations with the pro-Israeli US administration. By our informant's account, a number of Indian and US pilots practiced dogfights, in which the US airmen expected their Indian counterparts to be wiped off their radar screens. The opposite is said to have happened. The US pilots were time and again 'shot down' by the Indian pilots. How come?

When the US pilots were debriefed by their commanders, they insisted that the Indians were flying in strange formations, almost like the Israelis. When the US investigated, it discovered that the Indian interception pilots had received special training in Israel from Israeli interception pilots. But this explanation was not enough for the US top brass. Further investigation showed that the Israelis had sold some of their latest air-to-air missiles, which can be launched in 360 degrees, to India.
The US was furious; its pilots have no missiles of this kind. The US was aware of the Israeli capability, but was astonished about the sale and DEEP - ToT to the Indians.

Amos Yaron, Director-General of Israel's Ministry of Defence, was asked for an explanation by the US, which had provided the finance for the Israelis to develop their missiles. Yaron's explanation was not good enough for the US, so it approached the Israeli government and demanded Yaron be replaced. If he was not removed, there would be no US military co-operation. Nothing happened. Yaron was supposed to step down from his job in the summer. But what about Israel and the Indians?

Prediction: The close Indo-Israeli relationship will continue, as will the much closer Israeli-US relationship. Israel's friends in Washington will see to that.

Friday, March 03, 2006

Dawn of the new cold war

US says ready to sell advanced arms to India...

"It is our goal to help meet India's needs in the defence realm, and to provide important capabilities and technologies that India seeks. We are on a path to accomplish this..." George bush on his recent India Visit.

The game is rapidly changing. The lines are drawn - It's in black and white ...Pakistan is China's ally(Gen. Musharaf's visit to China co-inciding with Bush's visit to India) and India is the American ally. A new cold war has begun. The core of it all - the mid-east oil. The first battle ground is the subcontinent.

i. "A nuclear deal between Washington and Islamabad is not possible at this juncture as there were 'concerns' over Pakistan's proliferation record". US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

ii. ...this is not a stage Pakistan is currently in. This is not the time for such an arrangement with Pakistan". On Pak-US Nuke deal.

iii. Musharaf's Live statement [2nd March '06] : "We have other options... namely China"

But this cold war is very different. Everyone wants to trade and engage one another. That is the way of keeping each other at bay. China will go to great lengths as Pakistan is now its energy and trade corridor ( Gwadar ). US will try to restrict this and may even incite India to war or create insurgency situations to disrupt the corridor. But the stakes are very high- with nuclear weapons on each side.

It is not just a question of supplying hi-tech arms to India. There are other factors, which worry china and pakistan.

To begin with, lets look the bigger picture. The Indian IT and BPO/ KPO sectors are integrating with American companies, many people both in India and the US, have started thinking on these lines for the American Military-Industrial Complex.

In some areas, India is increasingly merging all aspects of the military supply chain, which includes joint R&D, joint production, outsourcing from various subcontractors both in US and India, joint marketing, and joint induction in the respective military wings.

It is due to this that India has embarked on this process of enacting Intellectual Property Laws (IPR) and Procurement Guidelines, so that both the military-industrial complexes can work together. India want's to save on cost of R&D and production (many hi-tech Israeli defense manufacturing units migrating to India). Add to this the constantly increasing defence budgets, for the Americans there is market to be tapped here.

In fact India has started doing this with old business partners like Russia. Even as Jacques Chirac was in India, an agreement was signed to move more in the direction of joint production. India is after hi-tech, and is finding more and more partners for doing this - flirting with everybody, who have hi-tech.

Considering that US has been successful in stopping European hi-tech weapon sale to the Chinese, Chinese themselves are being hindered in aquiring hi-tech weaponry. With the departure of Gerhard Schröder and soon Jacques Chirac, it is going to be even more difficult for the Chinese to get the weapon embargo lifted.